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ABSTRACT  During the last decade, Asian countries have become more noticeable in Africa. 
“China in Africa,” and then “India in Africa,” have been talked about as hot topics in academia 
and journalism. We have already seen an enormous amount of research about “China in Afri-
ca.” Before China and India, the issue of “Japan in Africa” was focused on in the 1990s. “South 
Korea in Africa” is the next issue. This article aims to understand the “Asian” character of 
African policy through a comparative study of four major Asian countries: China, India, Japan, 
and South Korea. This article firstly summarizes the history of relations between these four 
Asian countries and Africa. Secondly, it analyzes principal features of the African policies of 
the four Asian countries. Finally this article compares the four countries’ approaches to Africa 
to consider the Asian character of African policy and Asia-Africa relations for the coming de-
cades.
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“China has an African policy. Africa doesn’t have a China policy.”(1)
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Asian approaches to Africa became a very hot topic in African stud-
ies as emerging actors in Africa. Besides Western traditional donors or partners, 
BRICS(2) in Africa are starting to talk. We have already seen an enormous amount 
of research about “China in Africa,” from scandalous articles to analytical works. 
Now we see many studies about “India in Africa.” Brazil,(3) Russia, South Korea 
(Republic of Korea), and Turkey in Africa are now being discussed as coming 
topics.
This article aims to consider the character of the African policy of four major 
Asian countries (China, India, Japan, and South Korea) through a comparative 
study. These four Asian countries are not only influential partners with Africa, 
but also the most influential countries in Asia. It is reasonable to analyze and 
compare these countries’ approaches to Africa in order to better grasp Asia-Africa 
relations. However, I should point out that I am aware of the ambiguity of the 
concept “Asia.”(4) It often refers to geography. This concept does not necessarily 
influence the identity of the more than 3 billion people who live in this region.
During the last two decades, we have seen many forums for Africa’s develop-
ment, which were held in Asian countries.(5) There seems to be an inflation of 
African forums in Asian countries. Recently, the need for African studies in Asian 
countries is growing rapidly. While we found an enormous number of studies on 
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specific Asian countries’ approaches to Africa, we have not found sufficient com-
parative works that seek the “Asia-ness” of African policy.
This article is a preparatory reflection on the “Asian” character of African pol-
icy. This article will compare the African policy of the four major Asian partners 
of Africa, in terms of historical context, diplomatic and economic interest, inter-
national cooperation, and African forums.
BRIEF HISTORY OF ASIA-AFRICA RELATIONS
The historical context of Asian countries should not be underestimated when 
analyzing contemporary Asian approaches to Africa. First, we need to focus on 
the history of the rivalries among the Asian countries. This point has not been 
sufficiently considered in previous studies on Asia-Africa relations.
Rivalry among these four Asian countries has often been reflected in the Afri-
can policy of each country. We have seen disputes between China and India, China 
and Japan, China and South Korea, and Japan and South Korea on territorial and 
other issues. Outside these four countries, Taiwan issues have influenced China’s 
African policy, and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) issues 
have influenced South Korea’s African policy. Unlike European international rela-
tions after the European Union process started, a strong framework for consensus 
in Asian international relations does not exist yet.
Among Asian countries, the memory of colonialism is not in the past. European 
and Japanese colonialisms have brought problematic issues to Asian international 
relations. Anti-colonialism and nonaligned liaisons between Asia and Africa have 
existed as a traditional tie ever since the Bandung Conference in 1955. After the 
cold war was over, Asian countries started rapid economic development. Asian 
countries that were former recipients of development aid became donor actors, 
which began to change the concept of “donor.” Donor countries no longer mean 
Western industrialized countries (including Japan) in this second decade of the 
21st century. We should consider this transformation of the world’s situation in 
analyzing Asia and Africa relations.
I. Brief History of China and Africa
China has never been a “new” actor in Africa. The Chinese government began 
its history with Africa during the Ming Dynasty (René, 2010: 15). China’s com-
munist regime has established relations with African countries. China’s cooperation 
with Africa started before the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s–1970s. China joined 
the United Nations, thanks to the African countries’ diplomatic support. China 
offered aid to African countries, despite its difficult economic condition. The most 
symbolic Chinese cooperation to Africa in those days was the Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway construction. China’s cooperation had been guided by eight principles, pre-
sented by Zhou Enlai in 1964.
Economic development after Deng Xiaoping’s reform transformed China into 
a huge donor. In the 21st century, “China in Africa” became a very hot topic in 
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African studies and international relations studies. China became the second larg-
est trade partner with Africa, after the United States. The increase of China’s 
presence in Africa created fear in the Western world (Alden, 2007: 19). For 
example, China increased its influence in Francophone Africa, while France has 
decreased its influence in its former African colonies.(6)
China’s first principle of cooperation is non-interference in the internal affairs 
of the partner countries. China has accused the Western donors of political con-
ditionality on aid, such as democratization, good governance, and human rights. 
Nevertheless, China’s presence has also influenced crucial political issues in 
African countries, for example, the Zambian Presidential election in 2006.(7)
II. Brief History of India and Africa
India is a former British colony. India shared with African countries the expe-
rience of colonization by European countries. Mahatma Gandhi is to this day 
recognized as the symbolic person that bridges India and Africa.(8) Gandhi was 
devoted to the civil rights of Indian Diasporas in South Africa as a lawyer for 
two decades. His experiences in South Africa made him the great political 
leader for the independence movement of India. After independence, Nehru’s 
non-interference principle, nonaligned, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism 
had been retained for decades in India’s African policy (Beri, 2011: 5; Vines, 
2010: 3). India has claimed to be the leader of third world.
However, this tradition was modified pragmatically after India started its rapid 
economic growth in the 1990s (Beri, 2011: 5; Cheru & Obi, 2011: 14). India 
needs Africa for energy, food security, and as a market for Indian products. India 
estimated that it would become the third largest energy consuming country in 
2030. India is relying on Africa to continue its economic development. During 
colonial time, Indian Diasporas became rooted in African society (Dubey, 2010). 
The established networks of Indian Diasporas is an advantage for India in con-
ducing cooperation and business in Africa (Cheru & Obi, 2010: 4).
III. Brief History of Japan and Africa
Compared to China and India, Japan is a relatively new actor in Africa. Until 
the 1960s, African countries were important trade partners for cotton products in 
developing the Japanese economy. After the industrial structure changed, Japan 
reduced economic interests in Africa, except during the two oil crisis moments 
in the 1970s.(9) In the 1990s, Japan became the top donor country in the world 
and a massive Asian donor to Africa throughout the decade.
Japan showed its diplomatic ambition in its involvements in Africa. Japan 
increased its ODA for Africa and dispatched troops for PKO in Mozambique and 
Rwanda. Japan was the first to start the African forum among the Asian coun-
tries. But African policy never occupied an important place in Japan’s diplomacy. 
Japan’s originality in terms of African policy has not been made apparent. In the 
21st century, Japan fell into aid fatigue due to its economic crisis. Japan radi-
cally reduced its ODA and presence in Africa.
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IV. Brief History of South Korea and Africa
South Korea is aware that they had undergone a typical process as a develop-
ing country (Rhee, 1993: 15). South Korea’s engagement with Africa aims to 
promote the Korean development model for Africa’s economic development and 
industrialization (Shelton, 2009: 7). Due to the Korean War, South Korea’s income 
per capita was almost equal to Ghana at its independence in 1957. South Korea’s 
rivalry with North Korea was a crucial concern in the 1960s and 1970s for their 
African policy.
Table 1 shows the diplomatic struggle between South and North Korea in the 
1960s. The Park administration refused the co-existence of two sovereign Koreas 
in diplomacy until the beginning of the 1970s. South Korea broke diplomatic 
Table 1. Diplomatic relations of the two Koreas with Africa (until 1968)
Establishment of diplomatic relation
Country South Korea North Korea
Algeria September 25, 1958
Benin August 1, 1961
Botswana April 18, 1968
Burundi March 11, 1967
Cameroon August 10, 1961
CAR September 5, 1963
Chad August 6, 1961
Congo (Brazaville) August 18, 1961 (closed in 1965) 1964
Congo (Leopoldville) April 6, 1963
Ethiopia December 23, 1963
Gabon October 1, 1962
The Gambia April 21, 1965
Ghana December 8, 1964
Guinea June 15, 1960
Cote d’Ivoire July 23, 1961
Upper Volta April 20, 1962
Kenya February 7, 1964
Lesotho December 7, 1966
Liberia March 18, 1964
Madagascar June 25, 1962
Malawi March 9, 1965
Mali October 31, 1960
Mauritania (closed in 1964) November 12, 1964
Morocco July 6, 1962
Niger July 27, 1961
Rwanda March 21, 1963
Senegal October 19, 1962
Somalia April 13, 1967
Swaziland November 10, 1968
Tanzania January 13, 1965
Togo July 26, 1963
Uganda March 26, 1963
Source: Rhee (1993: 6), modified by the author.
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relations with the African countries that recognized North Korea.(10) But South 
Korea had to pragmatically modify its diplomatic principles with Africa (Rhee, 
1993: 4–5). The Park government officially abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine in 
1973 (Rhee, 1993: 5) and restored diplomatic relations with African countries that 
had diplomatic relations with North Korea.
After the 1990s, South Korea’s diplomatic concerns decreased in Africa. Economic 
interests and humanitarian motives increased. South Korea joined the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD in 2009. South Korea is recognized as 
a developed and “northern” donor country.
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN POLICIES OF FOUR ASIAN 
COUNTRIES




The year 2006 was a threshold of China-Africa relations. The Chinese gov-
ernment published a document entitled “China’s African Policy”(11) in this year. 
China’s general feature of their approaches to Africa is a composition of coop-
eration, investment, and trade under strong state ownership, led by the commu-
nist party. China has claimed itself as the largest “developing” country. China’s 
guiding rule of international cooperation is clearly different from Western donors. 
The Chinese “win-win” model of cooperation does not derive from the idea of 
charity. Aid and business are closely intertwined. Like India, China has a huge 
poor population. It is not easy for the Chinese government to persuade the nation 
about why it continues international cooperation (Pehnelt & Abel, 2007: 3). After 
China has become a giant actor in Africa, the concept of the “donor” becomes 
more relative, while China does not accept to be called a “donor.”
Aggressive involvement by Chinese local governments in African policy is a 
remarkable feature of the Chinese approach when compared to the other three 
Asian countries. Provinces(12) are the main actors of China’s local government 
cooperation in Africa (Brown & Chun, 2009: 10). They are not only local gov-
ernments, but also sometimes traders, project builders, investors, aid providers, 
and inter-governmental actors (Chen & Junbo, 2009: 1).(13) The Chinese-African 
People’s Friendship Association (CAPFA) is the coordinator organization for local 
cooperation between China and Africa. Executive members of CAPFA have reg-
ularly visited African countries. CAPFA has also received frequent local and 
national delegations from African countries. CAPFA has organized seminars in 
Africa and China.(14) China has established more than 100 sister city agreements 
with African local governments.(15) These local networks promote Chinese local 
industries and investments in Africa. Chinese local governments have frequently 
sent their delegations to African countries with local companies.(16) At the fifth 
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Conference of Africities (Africité) held in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2009, a tripar-
tite cooperation by the local governments of China, Africa, and France was 
announced.(17) Many participants at this conference were impressed by how China 
could have local influence in Africa.
2. Interests in Africa
Africa has been diplomatically and economically important to China. China 
needed Africa’s diplomatic support to return to the United Nations (Li, 2007: 78), 
to struggle against Taiwan, to protect itself from accusations of human rights vio-
lation, most notably the Tiananmen incident (Taylor, 2009: 13) by the Western 
world (Liu Hongwu, 2009: 34–36; Li, 2007: 75), to hold the Beijing Olympic 
games (Alden, 2007: 22), and to block the UN Security Council (UNSC) reform, 
particularly against Japan’s new permanent membership. Chinese national leaders 
have frequently visited Africa, which is China’s traditional eminent feature in 
policy, and has brought about diplomatic advantages.
China’s principal feature of its African policy is non-interference with African 
countries’ internal affairs. But there is one pre-condition for this approach: the 
“one China principle.” African countries must establish diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate authority in China in order 
to receive China’s cooperation.(18) China never works for any country with dip-
lomatic ties to Taiwan.(19) The Hallstein doctrine is strictly adhered to between 
China and Taiwan (Brautigam, 2009: 67). The one China principle works practi-
cally as a diplomatic conditionality for African countries.
Democratization (“political reform” in Chinese expression) in Africa in the 
1990s was a very sensitive issue for China (Liu Hongwu, 2009: 38–39; Li, 2005: 
69),(20) because in the beginning of the 1990s some “democratically” elected Afri-
can regimes recognized Taiwan. Needless to say, Africa is also economically 
important for China. Africa is a large trade and investment market, and a partner 
of Chinese companies and the state in securing energy and food. China needs 
Africa to further advance its economic development and to satisfy its people in 
order to legitimize its regime.
3. ODA
China claims itself the leader of non OECD-DAC partners. China calls its 
cooperation “South-South cooperation.” China does not use the word “aid” or 
“donor” in its cooperation. South-South cooperation implies that China helps other 
developing countries as a developing country itself.(21) China’s Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) has been veiled. China had not published any reports on 
cooperation (Brautigam, 2009: 20). China’s aid system is different from the 
OECD’s norm. China has no duty of peer review by OECD members. A market 
rate loan is included in cooperation. However, China did present a whitepaper on 
China’s ODA in April 2011,(22) which was the first official report on the ODA. 
China is not a new actor, but an emergent and “different” actor in terms of inter-
national cooperation.
China’s aid does not derive from missionary charity. China clearly insists that 
they support Africa in order to be supported by Africa. Despite its non-interference 
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principle, China’s cooperation has “politically” organized in Africa, for example, 
they have assisted with the construction of a Presidential palace, Foreign Ministry 
building, and national stadium, according to the African leaders’ requirements. These 
showy projects were “diplomatically” successful, but sometimes implicated in 
corruption and political disputes in the recipient countries. However, China’s 
entrance as an influential donor in Africa might be a good opportunity to ques-
tion development aid, after an unnecessarily successful history of a half century.
China has no specific aid agency. The main organizer of China’s ODA is not 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but of Commerce (Berger & Wissenbach, 2007: 
14). China’s cooperation is naturally oriented toward economic interests. The Min-
istry of Commerce has small staff in the division of international cooperation 
(Brautigam, 2009: 109). Eximbank was established in 1994, and is the main 
engine of cooperation, through concession loans.(23) The local governments are 
also important actors of international cooperation. It is China’s character and 
advantage to establish relations in Africa.
China’s ODA has remarkably increased during the last decade, particularly with 
budgets from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce. China prefers 
to work with other “developing countries” for Africa, like BRICS and the G20 
framework. South Africa joined BRICS as a new member at the Sanya confer-
ence held in China in April 2011.(24)
In terms of China’s style of ODA, we find similarities with Japan’s coopera-
tion. Before China and India, “Japan in Africa” was focused on during the 1990s 
in the Western world with some fears. The similarities of cooperation between 
China and Japan were very naturally formed. China had been the biggest recipi-
ent country of Japan’s ODA for decades. Infrastructure biased turn-key systems, 
helping dictatorial regimes, the destruction of the environment, ties to domestic 
companies, repayment of loans by natural resources, request-based systems, land 
tenure, and low grant loans had already been criticized as problems with Japan’s 
ODA, although no country is innocent, more or less, in terms of these points.
4. Trade and investment
China’s ODA is strongly intertwined with trade and investment in Africa. This 
is a conglomerate of state and local governments, plus private or state-owned 
companies. China’s affiliation with the WTO in 2001 was the big turning point 
on the issue of “China in Africa.”(25) Trade between China and Africa expanded 
six times, from US$20 billion in 2001 to US$120 billion in 2009 (Cheru & Obi, 
2011: 13). China aggressively entered into Africa after affiliation to the WTO. 
State-owned and private companies were pushed by government financial support. 
The Chinese government is politically and diplomatically dominant, but not in 
trade and investment (Taylor, 2009: 58). The Chinese local governments have 
worked for local companies to invest in Africa (Alden, 2007: 29–30, 133).
5. Forum framework
The forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been held every three 
years since 2000.(26) FOCAC2 in 2003 is known for the Beijing consensus (Alden, 
2007: 105), an appeal which criticized the political conditionality of Western 
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countries for aid. China recognizes FOCAC3 (2006) as the memorial event of 
China-Africa relations. From this year on, “China in Africa” gained a worldwide 
spotlight. This forum impressed the world because the diplomatic war against 
Taiwan was practically over in Africa.(27) In 2006, before FOCAC3, Senegal and 
Chad broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan to re-establish relations with China.(28) 
In particular, the loss of ties to Chad brought definitive damage to Taiwan. Tai-
wan lost not only the diplomatic support, but also oil resources in Africa. China 
started to work more comfortably in Africa. However, the “Taiwan card” has not 
lost its meaning in Africa yet (Brautigam, 2009: 125).
II. India
1. General character
In the 21st century, India clearly is in a strong rivalry with China in Africa 
(Vines, 2010: 2).(29) India faces competition with China in pursuing and realizing 
its interests in Africa. India’s leading actors in Africa are the private companies 
such as Tata, Mittal, and Airtel. Besides this competition against China, India is 
also eager to achieve permanent membership in the UN Security Council. One 
motive is to be equal with China in the international community. China has not 
supported India’s permanent membership (Carmody, 2011: 41). India has called 
African partners to encourage the reform (democratization) of the United Nations 
and international organizations. The India is conscious of China in Africa, eco-
nomically, diplomatically, and on security affairs. Indian Diasporas increased their 
importance in India’s African policy (Beri, 2011: 12). India profits maximally 
from the established network of Indian Diasporas in Africa. Indian Diasporas are 
rooted in African society, particularly in eastern and southern Africa. India recov-
ered from the trauma of the exile of Indian Diasporas from Uganda in the 1970s 
under the Amin regime.
2. Interests in Africa
After having failed at their UN reform attempt in 2006 with Brazil, Germany, and 
Japan, India chose to work with emergent developing countries to achieve its diplo-
matic goal in the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) framework. India expects 
IBSA, under Indian initiative, to be outside of China’s influence. Defense of the sea 
lane in the Indian ocean is crucial for India (van Rooyen, 2011: 17–18; Bhattacha-
rya, 2010: 72; Carmody, 2011: 43; Vines, 2011: 191). India is very conscious of the 
Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean (van Rooyen, 2011: 13).(30)
Economic interest is a vital issue for India. Africa provides 18% of India’s 
crude oil imports. In 2030, India estimates that it will be the third highest energy 
consuming country in the world, and that its domestic coal resources will dry up 
in 40 years (Naidu, 2011: 53). Energy security is India’s first concern. Besides 
oil, Indian companies have increased their investments in other natural resources, 
agriculture and ICT. Telecommunication companies such as Airtel and Essar, thirst 
for the African market.
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3. ODA
India is not an OECD donor. So it is difficult to know the exact amount of aid 
that India distributes (Cheru & Obi, 2011: 17). Like China, India prefers the con-
cept of South-South cooperation, rather than that of aid or donor. India does not 
question tied aid. But at present, India cannot compete against China in diplomacy 
or the amount of aid and investment to Africa (Cheru & Obi, 2011: 13; René, 
2010: 34). India should show its advantage to African partners (see Table 2). One 
remarkable point is low technology (low capital intensity) cooperation.
Will India’s development with “democracy” be a model for Africa? (Vittorini 
& Harris, 2011: 212) India claims itself as the largest democracy, but it is not 
active in providing democracy support to African countries.(31) India doubts the 
double standard of Western donors on political conditionality for aid (Price, 2011: 
19). India has tried to show difference from Western donors’ approach.
India has no particular aid agency (Sinha, 2010: 79),(32) but is planning to estab-
lish its cooperation agency (Carmody, 2011: 40–41). India has shouldered mili-
tary cooperation in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and military training.
4. Trade and investment
India-Africa trade has increased 30 times from 1991 to 2009, from US$914 
million to US$25 billion (Cheru & Obi, 2011: 13).(33) Investment by private com-
panies is also expected to rise rapidly from US$479 million (2008) to US$5.4 
billion (2013) (Cheru & Obi, 2011: 22). Besides vying for natural resources, agri-
culture, pharmacy, and telecommunication companies are aggressively entering 
Africa.
As a former British colony, India lacks networks in Francophone West Africa 
(Vittorini & Harris, 2011: 204). Recently, India is very eager to enter into Fran-
cophone Africa (Dubey, 2009: i–ii). The Indian government has set up the “Team 
9” project in 2003 to promote Indian business, mainly in the Francophone and 
Lusophone West African countries. The Indian government is also trying to increase 
Indian embassies in African countries (Vines, 2010: 8).
Table 2. Symbolic claims of Western and South-South development actors
Western donors South-South development cooperation partners
Charity Opportunity
Moral obligation to the unfortunate Solidarity with other third world countries
Expertise based on superior knowledge,
institutions, science and technology
Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing
development in poor country circumstances
Sympathy for different and distant others Empathy based on a shared identity and experience
The virtue of suspended obligation, a lack of
reciprocation
The virtue of mutual benefit and recognition of
reciprocity
Source: Mawdsley (2011: 176), edited by the author.
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5. Forum framework
India started its African forum in 2008. The second India-Africa Forum Summit 
was held in Addis Ababa, in May 2011. Like China, India organizes it in Indian 
and African countries, one after the other. In these forums, India has repeatedly 
and so clearly asked for Africa’s support toward India’s membership of a perma-
nent seat on the UNSC.
The remarkable arguments of the Delhi Declaration (April 9, 2008) at the first 
forum were the clear support for democracy in Africa and demand for the dem-
ocratic reform of international organizations, such as the UN, Bretton Woods 
Institutions, and the WTO. Permanent membership in the UNSC for India is 
couched in this demand for reform.(34) India depends much on the goodwill of 
the African elite class for its diplomatic ambition (Carmody, 2011: 42). Three 
years after the first forum, the Addis Ababa Declaration (May 25, 2011) at the 
second forum strongly advanced the South-South cooperation idea, and demanded 
the achieving of an ODA amount to 0.7% of the GNI to OECD donor countries. 
India again asked for Africa’s support for India to achieve permanent member-
ship in the UNSC.(35)
III. Japan
1. General character
Japan’s leading actors for African policy are the bureaucrats of the Foreign Min-
istry with weak interests from the politicians and the people (Morikawa, 2000: 
144). In contrast to China and India, Japanese companies became less aggressive 
in Africa after the industrial structural change in the 1970s. Traditionally, the Jap-
anese government does not have any particular African policy. Japan’s involvement 
in Africa’s development has been reactive to the requirements from the United 
States and European countries (Morikawa, 2000: 143–144, 155). Japan’s ODA to 
Africa in the 1980s increased to avoid trade conflict with the US (Sato & Alden, 
2004: 28). Political level communication with Africa has not been sufficient. The 
first visit of the incumbent Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, to sub-Saharan Africa 
was in 2000. Japan finds little crucial economic interests in Africa, except for 
natural resources. The sea lane security is important for Japan. In June 2011, Japan 
constructed a base for its Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijo Jieitai) in Djibouti 
for antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden region (van Rooyen, 2011: 20).(36)
2. Interests in Africa
Japan’s biggest interest in Africa is a diplomatic one. It is similar to India to 
achieve permanent membership in the UNSC. The beginning of the 1990s was 
the most noticeable period for Japan’s activities in Africa. Japan sent troops for 
PKO to Mozambique in 1993–1995 (ONUMOZ) (Carvalho, 2011) and Rwanda 
in 1994 (with a base in Zaire). Among Asian countries, Japan was the first to 
organize an African forum, the Tokyo International Conference for Africa’s Devel-
opment (TICAD)(37) in 1993. Japan was the biggest donor country throughout the 
1990s. However, Japan’s ambition to achieve UN reform with India, Brazil, and 
Germany was not fulfilled as the motion failed in 2006.
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3. ODA
Nowadays, Japan is generally considered to be a “Western” type donor. But 
we can find some aspects of a prototype of Asian countries’ cooperation for 
Africa’s development. For example, Japan has not actively required any political 
conditionality for aid. Now we talk “Beijing consensus.” But on political condi-
tionality for aid, China’s approach is not so different to Japan’s one. The Japanese 
“request based” (yoseishugi) and “self-help effort” (jijo doryoku) principles are 
used for highly tied projects of Japan’s own economic promotion. The “Miracle 
of East Asia (Japan)” has been repeatedly referred to African countries by the 
Japanese government. But Japan does not have any particular African policy or 
philosophy, while the ODA amount had increased by requirement of the Western 
donor countries. “Soft-power” and “human security”(38) ideas have been touted as 
the principal axes in Japan’s cooperation to Africa.
It is very natural to find similarities between Japan’s and China’s cooperation, 
because China had been the biggest recipient country of Japan’s ODA for decades 
(Li, 2009: 88), for war reparations and, in particular, the economic interests of 
Japan. China had been familiar with Japan’s cooperation (Brautigam, 2009: 80, 
161), for example, using very large credits, tied to Chinese machinery equipment 
and construction services, for the repayment of loans in oil or other resources. This 
is the essence of the Chinese “win-win” approach (Brautigam, 2009: 307). China 
is now criticized of repayment in natural resources and agriculture products.(39) But 
this natural resource repayment scheme was practiced with Japan’s cooperation to 
China for a long time (Brautigam, 2009: 46–47). Japan was the top donor for a 
decade in the 1990s, while Western countries had in aid fatigue. But now Japan 
is really tired, and has radically reduced its ODA for more than ten years. For 
example, in 2001, Japan reduced by 30% its aid budget compared to the previous 
year.
4. Trade and investment
While trade with Africa increased from US$10.6 billion in 2002 to US$26.4 
billion in 2007, Japanese companies have been reluctant to enlarge their trade 
and investment in Africa due to political risks and instability. Trade with Africa 
remains small, accounting for 1.5% of Japan’s total trade. Investment into Africa 
also remains inactive, accounting for 0.7% of Japan’s direct foreign investment 
(JETRO, 2006: 17–20).(40) TICAD repeatedly pledges the promotion of trade and 
investment in Africa. Japanese companies have not been eager to accelerate their 
business in Africa (Morikawa, 2000: 148).
However, this trend in Japanese business in Africa began to change, as eco-
nomic situations fluctuated in Japan and the world. The Western markets declined 
with economic crisis, while African countries have kept up economic develop-
ment in 21st century.
5. Forum framework
Japan organized TICAD in 1993. It was the first and only African forum orga-
nized in Asian countries at that time. TICAD is held every 5 years with follow-up 
meetings. Japan had been very eager to show its capacity for permanent member-
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ship in the UNSC. So far, it was the only moment that Japan’s diplomatic goal 
seemed close to achievement. It was the golden age of Japan’s presence in Africa. 
Several months before TICAD3 (2003), a Japanese diplomat argued that “NEPAD 
(the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) was born from the TICAD pro-
cess,”(41) but this idea has not been accepted in the international community and 
African countries.
Japan has also referred to “South-South” cooperation at TICAD3 in 2003(42) 
(Ogasawara, 2004: 68–70). But it is not similar to China’s and India’s South-South 
cooperation. Japan does not recognize itself as a developing country. So, Japan is 
not a direct actor of South-South cooperation. This South-South cooperation is 
coordinated by northern country (Japan). In this “South-South” cooperation frame-
work, Japan coordinates and financially supports cooperation between South-East 
Asian countries and African countries. Japan expected to promote investment and 
trade from South-East Asia to Africa, because Japanese companies have not been 
active in Africa, despite TICAD’s repeated pledges. Japan needs South-East Asian 
countries’ support to realize its pledge of TICAD. Technically, it is more effective 
to transfer a development model from south to south. However, this cooperation 
scheme had no remarkable impacts in Africa. One reason was the economic crisis 
in Asian countries at the end of the 1990s (Morikawa, 2000: 157). Japan could no 
longer show its capacity as a giant donor and needed additional cooperation tools 
to keep its influence in Africa. Japan started TICAD to achieve permanent mem-
bership in the UNSC (Morikawa, 2000: 155). However, its activities slowed down 
with its decreasing ODA, while China has rapidly increased its influence in Africa 
(Alden, 2007: 110).
Japan has hardly changed their African policy through the TICAD process. The 
TICAD declarations did not show originality, as other declarations have done for 
decades. The emphasis has been on the amount of aid pledged. TICAD’s core ideas, 
“ownership”(43) and “partnership,” are not truly Japan’s original ideas, as they had 
already been touted in the OECD-DAC (Kamo, 2004: 60). The sole original idea 
presented at TICAD was the above-mentioned “South-South” cooperation (Obayashi, 
2004: 79). TICAD4 (2008) showed a return to traditional mode of cooperation, 
such as infrastructure building and tied aid. After the entrance of Asian emergent 
partners into Africa, Japan’s South-South cooperation is questionable.
IV. South Korea
1. General character
“South Korea in Africa” issue has not yet attracted the limelight in the way that 
“Japan, China, and India in Africa” are. South Korea is the latest DAC member. 
Korea became a northern donor country, no longer a southern actor. It is very inter-
esting to consider South Korea’s membership in DAC and its influence over Afri-
can policy. However, we need time to analyze it. Among the four countries, South 
Korea’s position is characteristic. South Korea emphasizes the G20 framework. Like 
other major Asian countries, South Korea seeks energy and food security in Africa. 
Huge Korean companies have increased their agro-investment in Africa.
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2. Interests in Africa
Joining the DAC was the condition for South Korea to show its capacity as a 
“developed” country and northern donor. Since 2000, South Korea has challenged 
to join DAC, as membership was the symbolic status of a developed country. 
Korea’s DAC membership was approved in November 2009.(44) Korean research-
ers have pointed out the problems, or insufficiency, of Korean ODA in terms of 
quantity, quality, and policy (Kim, 2012: 37).
3. ODA
Korea’s ODA volume is still very small in comparison to its economic power. 
Their ODA amount was US$673 million in 2007, only US$16/person, 0.07% of 
GNI, the lowest level in all DAC member countries. In 2005, the Korean gov-
ernment announced that it will increase their ODA amount to 0.1% of GNI by 
2009 and 0.25% by 2015 (Kim, 2012: 44). The incumbent UN secretary general, 
Ban Ki-moon, had once been the Korean Foreign Minister. The international com-
munity expects to see a radical ODA increase from Korea.
South Korea has a cooperation agency. The Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA) was established in 1991. Korea’s main ODA organizer is the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Economic Development Cooperation 
Fund (ECDF) was founded in 1987 under the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
to provide financial cooperation (Kim, 2012: 41). Like other countries, Korea’s 
ODA is noticed as highly tied aid. Korean conglomerate group companies (chae-
bol), such as Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai, and LG, have been procured in Korean 
ODA projects (Kim, 2012: 46). The Korean government has tried to reduce the 
proportion of tied projects. The “Saemaeul Movement”(45) has sometimes been 
shown as a development model for Africa. Despite such efforts, the Korean ODA 
model for sharing Korean development experience still is not sufficiently estab-
lished (Kim, 2012: 56).
South Korea is presently expanding its capacity to engage in PKO, with a view 
to facilitating rapid deployment to troubled areas worldwide, including Africa. Rapid 
response PKO forces are to be increased to 2,000 by 2012 (Shelton, 2009: 41).
4. Trade and investment
South Korea’s commercial relations with Africa have rapidly grown. Korea-
Africa trade tripled from US$5.1 billion in 2003 to US$14.2 billion in 2010.(46) 
Just as Chinese and Indian companies, Korean companies are also eager to invest 
in agriculture. Daewoo’s land tenure seeking in Madagascar caused a dispute with 
the local people.(47)
The Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC, 2006, 2008) 
and the Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation Forum (2008, 2009) were organized 
to help foster relations between Korea and Africa.
5. Forum framework
South Korea started its African forum in 2006. The Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) 
welcomed the participation of 5 African Presidents and 15 Foreign Ministers. At 
the second forum in 2009, South Korea pledged to double its ODA for Africa 
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by 2012, host 5,000 African trainees in 2009–2012, and to send 1,000 Korean 
overseas volunteers. The Seoul Declaration at the second Korea-Africa Forum 
(November 24, 2009) argued for detente and mutual trust in Africa, respect for 
the G20,(48) and the construction of nuclear plants in Africa as green energy.(49)
China, Japan, and South Korea have held a government official level (Director 
of Africa division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) meeting to talk African 
policy every year since 2008. This meeting aims to analyze FOCAC, KAF, and 
TICAD processes and coordinate the cooperation of the East Asian partners in 
Africa’s development.(50)
COMPARISON OF POLICIES AMONG THE FOUR MAJOR ASIAN COUNTRIES
I. Approaches to Africa
What differences or similarities exist in African policies among the four coun-
tries? I have compared the declarations,(51) which were presented in the African 
forums held in Asian countries. These declarations, or action plans, were named 
after the host city of each forum, such as Beijing, Delhi, Seoul, and Tokyo (plus 
Addis Ababa, Sharm El Sheikh, and Yokohama). Principally, these declarations have 
touted all-purpose such as development plans. These declarations have remarked 
crucial issues for Africa’s development, including agriculture, education, environ-
ment, health care, infrastructure, ICT, investment, and trade. But they present no 
priority in their cooperation with Africa. With similar development plans, the amount 
of pledges and the practices of cooperation project without reductions and delays, 
have been the only concern for African leaders. On the one hand, it is pretty 
important for the four Asian governments to organize, host, and follow African 
forums to show their capacity and diplomatic influence. On the other hand, these 
forums are just ceremonies for the participants from African countries, because 
the individual negotiations do not take place there.
In studying the four countries’ approaches to Africa, I found more similarities 
than differences among the Asian major partners of Africa. They are former 
recipient countries. Their cooperation is biased toward tied aid and infrastructure 
projects for domestic industry promotion. They consider Africa as important for 
their energy security issues. The symbolic expression “Beijing consensus” exempli-
fies the Asian major partners’ reluctance toward political conditionality in aiding 
the African countries. Could the Beijing consensus be understood as the “Asian” 
approach to Africa?
I argue that the international positions bring about the characteristics of each 
country regarding African policy. As Table 3 shows, Japan and South Korea are 
OECD-DAC members within the Western framework. China and India are out-
side OECD and pursue South-South cooperation. Their international positions are 
contrasted, but intertwined. China is not a G8 member, but is recognized as a 
very influential actor in the G8. South Korea adheres to the G20 as a northern 
country, while Japan persists in the G8 framework.
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II. Economic Interests
The economic interests of Asian countries in Africa are basically similar. These 
countries seek principally economic interests in Africa for energy, natural resources, 
and agricultural products. Some aggressive land tenure attempts have been accused 
of “land grabbing” (Naidu, 2011: 63). The international community is critical of 
the emergent countries’ aggressively seeking natural resources in Africa. However, 
it has been a pattern with the Western companies in Africa (Chatham House, 
2010: 2; Obi, 2010: 190–191). Telecommunication is now an important invest-
ment field for Chinese and Indian companies such as ZTE, Huawei, and Airtel.
Huge infrastructure projects with Chinese ODA have created business chances 
for Chinese companies. Sometimes, there has been conflict with the local people 
because the Chinese companies do not employ or employ under severe conditions 
for local workers. However this accusation is sometimes based on misunderstand-
ing. In fact, almost every worker in Chinese companies in Africa is African people 
(Brautigam, 2009: 229). African workers are not only employed as simple labor, 
but occasionally in managerial posts (Taylor, 2009: 179–180). China’s situation is 
also changing. Labor fees are increasing when employing Chinese labor. It has 
become more difficult to employ Chinese labor for construction projects in Africa.
III. International Relations Related to Africa
International relations and Asian rivalry have influenced the four Asian coun-
tries’ approaches to Africa. These four countries have often been tense with each 
other for historical, geopolitical, economic, and security reasons. Rivalry between 
Asian countries has reflected onto their African policy.
The issue of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is a big concern 
in the Asian approaches to Africa, particularly for China, India, and Japan. The 
reason is very simple. African countries possess more than a quarter of the votes 
in the UN General Assembly. Insofar as Japan and India seek to gain a perma-
nent seat, China can keep its diplomatic card in Africa to destabilize the African 
countries’ diplomatic support for Japan and India by proposing permanent seats 
to African countries. This strategy is available only for the already permanent 
member with veto power in the UN Security Council.
Western countries are still the dominant power, but no longer a monopolis-
tic actor in Africa (Cheru & Obi, 2010: 1; Berger & Wissenbach, 2007: 1). 
Table 3. Position in international community
China India Japan South Korea
OECD Non-OECD Non-OECD OECD OECD
G8 / G20 G20 G20 G8 G20
GDP Ranking 2nd 10th 3rd 14th
Source: World Bank (2011).
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After China and India became influential emergent powers in the beginning of 
the 21st century, the “donor” is no longer limited to Western countries. Has a 
“post-Washington consensus” been achieved? The European Union has offered 
partnership with China as donor in the form of a EU-China-Africa triangle 
(Aning, 2010: 153). Western donors can no longer ignore the Asian emergent 
powers in Africa, but rather need them as partners for development.
The traditional donor-recipient relationship will be transformed into a new 
kind of partnership. This new kind of partnership is designed to respond 
to common global and regional challenges and no longer focuses on a 
unidirectional–primarily charity-based–approach to development cooperation. 
(Berger & Wissenbach, 2007: 4)
For the past 20 years, the world’s hegemonic balance is changing (Cheru & 
Calais, 2010: 221). While the G8 framework became more relative (Cheru & 
Calais, 2010: 231), other frameworks, such as those of the G20 and BRICS, have 
gained importance. The presence of emergent countries in Africa has awoken 
questions about the former modes of aid (Brautigam, 2009: 17). China and India 
criticize the double standard and contradictions of the political conditionality which 
has been imposed by Western donors.
China is very conscious of accusations of human rights issues in Africa. China 
and South Korea’s African policies are closely related to their own national inte-
gration issues. Despite the economic changing, China and India maintain their 
ideology of leaders of the third world. Is the cooperation a charity or a mutual 
development opportunity? (Mawdsley, 2011: 167) This issue is closer now that 
emergent non-OECD partners have increased their influence in Africa.
At the present moment, only China has broadly established international rela-
tions with local governments in Africa. This local network is quite advantageous 
to China. After its own economic development, India tried to advance outside 
of the commonwealth countries. It is a new and important frontier for India to 
compete with China in Africa.
IV. Stakeholders of African Affairs
Each of four countries has different compositions in the stakeholders involved 
with African affairs. This determines who the principal characters are in their 
approaches to Africa. Needless to say, the government is the essential actor in 
all four countries. Private companies are aggressive actors in China, India, and 
South Korea, but not in Japan. In terms of political institutions, the Chinese 
communist party has held the initiatives for a long time in China’s African pol-
icy. The political parties in India, South Korea, and Japan have not played much 
role in African policy, but the attitudes may change. The Korean and Japanese 
religious organizations, such as The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification 
of World Christianity, Soka Gakkai International, and Sukyo Mahikari and NGOs 
have been more active in Africa. The Chinese local governments are active in 
Africa, with no parallel in the other three countries.
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CONCLUSION: ASIAN APPROACHES TO AFRICA
In conclusion, this article analyzed four major Asian countries’ approaches to 
Africa. It remains an introductory reflection, and there are many insufficient points 
to complete. It needs continued searching for detailed information on the African 
policy of each Asian country.
This article found more similarities than differences of the four Asian coun-
tries’ approaches to Africa. There cannot be a definitive conclusion about Asian 
approaches to Africa through this work only. However, I did present some signs 
of the “Asia-ness” in the African policy in this article, while they are not neces-
sarily character of Asian countries only.
All four Asian countries have sought “their model” for Africa’s development 
through their own development experiences. But I question whether these mod-
els, which are based on strong developmental states (Taylor, 2009: 25), are really 
applicable to the African countries. While the political systems are very different 
in the four countries, one point is surely common, in that the state is strong(52) 
and “public” in these countries. However, this “public-ness” of the state cannot 
necessarily be a precondition in considering the African state.(53)
The coming of age for Asia and Africa will arrive over the next few decades. 
It is necessary to study more the African policy of Asian partners. The major 
Asian countries also need to learn from other Asian approaches to Africa in order 
to improve their African policies. I expect that a common framework of African 
policies and academic platforms of African studies will emerge in Asia. After 
these four countries, we naturally expect that the other Asian countries, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to be the next Asian emergent actors 
in Africa.
In contrast, African countries have shown no strategy toward Asian countries 
(Obi, 2010: 192). Their attitudes remain reactive and passive with Asian partners. 
What strategies will the African countries apply in order to face these aggressive 
Asian approaches?
NOTES
(1) The Nation, Kenya, June 12, 2006, quoted by Taylor (2009: 182).
(2) South Africa joined in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) at the Sanya Conference 
in April 2011. http://www.ytwhw.com/2011/0414/BRIC-countries-the-third-meeting-of-
the-leaders-Sanya-Declaration-.html (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(3) See Cooper (2011) and Seibert (2011).
(4) The concept of Asia is more ambiguous geographically and psychologically than that of 
Africa. Geographical adjectives such as “East,” “South-East,” “South” and “Central” are 
used for better cognizance. While the concept of Africa is not unitary, the boundary as a 
continent is apparent.
(5) Japan held Africa Forums in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. China held the forums in 2000, 
2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012. South Korea held them in 2006, 2009, and 2012. Taiwan 
held one in 2007. India held them in 2008 and 2011.
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(6) A typical case was Niger. A Chinese company threatened a French nuclear company 
Areva’s monopoly in the mining of uranium in Niger (Michel & Beuret, 2008: 180–181).
(7) Opposition candidate Michael Sata declared that he would establish diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan after his election as President. He visited Taiwan before the presidential 
election (Brautigam, 2009: 6; Michel & Beuret, 2008: 321). China threatened to sus-
pend relations with Zambia if he was elected. Sata ended up in third place, but was 
elected during the next election. He did not talk about Taiwan during the 2011 electoral 
campaign.
(8) Opening Address by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, at the Plenary Ses-
sion-1 of India-Africa Forum Summit, New Delhi, April 8, 2008. Ministry of External 
Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/speech/2008/04/08ss01.htm (Accessed 
May 31, 2011).
(9) In the beginning of the 1960s, exports to Africa accounted for about 10% of Japan’s total 
trade. But it decreased to less than 1% at the end of the 1980s (Morikawa, 2000: 148).
(10) During the Vietnam War, South Korea supported the United States, which was criticized 
by the nonaligned countries (Rhee, 1993: 7). For example, the Congo (Brazzaville) and 
Mauritania broke relations with South Korea in order to establish a relationship with 
North Korea. South Korea then worried whether North Korea may increase influence in 
Africa through this diplomatic rupture.
(11) China’s African Policy (January 2006), http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/fo-
cac/183721.htm (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(12) In China, there are 33 province-level divisions, including 22 provinces, five autonomous 
regions (Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Tibet Au-
tonomous Regions), four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and 
two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau) (Chen & Junbo, 2009: 2).
(13) In February 2000, President Jiang Zemin, visiting Guangdong province, told the local 
leadership that in order to promote socialist modernization, China must adopt a “Going 
Out Strategy” to encourage Chinese companies to invest in overseas markets. Aid is one 
of the key components of China’s African policy. For decades, the provinces have acted 
as agents of the central government in the implementation of this aid policy. Often the 
central government decides the policy and provides the funding, while the provincial 
governments or related parties deliver the aid, sending medical teams, building structure, 
sponsoring training programs, etc. (Chen & Junbo, 2009: 12–13).
(14) Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association, http://www.capfa.org.cn/en/project.
asp?id=276, http://www.capfa.org.cn/en/news_l.asp?id=331 (Accessed June 22, 2012). 
China-Mali Bilateral Relations, Ministry of Commerce, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/subject/fuva/lanmub/201104/2011040752478 (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(15) Hunan-Brazzaville was the first China-Africa sister city agreement in 1982 (Liu Haifang, 
2010: 61). Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association, http://www.capfa.org.cn/
en/citie.asp (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(16) Through these sister-city channels, Chinese provincial politicians and officers frequently 
visited Africa. In general, they traveled mostly to search for economic cooperation 
opportunities, such as trade and investment (Chen & Junbo, 2009: 14).
(17) United Cities and Local Governments, http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/news.as
p?IdNews=be17c65ae01fe0de730402efbcd8009f6b5669cfd34fac8471b1274c617bae20
andPage=15andSrc= (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(18) See note (17).
(19) China sent exceptional peacekeeping troops for humanitarian reasons to Haiti when it 
was heavily hit by earthquake in January 2010. China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/video/2010-01/25/content_9371037.htm (Accessed January 21, 2012).
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(20) China evaluated that the 1990s had been a “lost decade” for Africa due to democratiza-
tion (Hu, 2009: 350).
(21) China-Africa aid relations were initially defined in terms of mutual cooperation rather 
than one-way alms-giving. Instead of using the language of donor and recipient, China 
strongly prefers to present its activities in terms of two-way exchanges and two-sided 
cooperation (Jin, 2010: 8).
(22) This report analyzed the history of cooperation during three periods of 1950s-70s, 70s-
80s, and 90s-present. China’s ODA Whitepaper April 21, 2011, The Central People’s 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-04/21/
content_1850553.htm (Accessed September 8, 2011).
(23) China’s ODA Whitepaper, 2011.
(24) “Sanya Declaration,” http://www.ytwhw.com/2011/0414/BRIC-countries-the-third-
meeting-of-the-leaders-Sanya-Declaration-.html (Accessed May 14, 2011).
(25) Promotion for foreign business was announced after China joined the WTO. Interna-
tional cooperation backed up Chinese business abroad. China’s ODA Whitepaper, 2011.
(26) See Li et al. (2012) for the details of the FOCAC process.
(27) The current Ma administration practically abandoned the Hallstein doctrine against China 
in Africa. Taiwan’s attitude toward China is more ambiguous in foreign policy (Taylor, 
2009: 29).
(28) After Malawi recognized China in 2008, only four African countries (Burkina Faso, the 
Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland) have kept diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan.
(29) “For Americans, Africa is mostly about poverty, aid, terrorism and sometimes sanctions 
against rogue regimes. For China, the vast landmass with millions of the world’s poorest 
is about digging for precious metals and sucking out the oil so desperately needed to fuel 
its roaring economy. For India, which has had a long history with the continent, it should 
be about long-term business and strategic interest that would give New Delhi a strong 
foothold to expand its influence in the years to come. It’s a slow, hard grind. But one that 
can spell big success” (Hindustan Times, Delhi, April 9, 2008).
(30) India concluded a defense agreement with Mauritius to assure its own sea lane security.
(31) Africa-India Framework for Cooperation, New Delhi, April 9, 2008. Ministry of External 
Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/indafrica2008/09ia01.htm (Accessed 
May 31, 2011).
(32) Assistance to African countries falls under two Commonwealth initiatives, the Indian 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program launched in 1964, and the Special 
Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan. India spends about $12 million annually on 
ITEC activities. As the ITEC division explains: “India is not a rich country and cannot 
offer grants-in-aid to match those of the developed countries. It does, however, possess 
skills of manpower and technology more appropriate to the geographical and ecological 
conditions and the stage of technological development of several developing countries” 
(Beri, 2011: 9).
(33) In 2008–2009, South Africa remained the leading destination for India’s exports to Af-
rica, accounting for 13.5%. Other major export destinations included Egypt (11.2%), 
Nigeria (10.3%), Kenya (9.1%), Tanzania (7%), Mauritius (6.5%), and Algeria (4.5 %). 
Around 35.8% of India’s imports from Africa were sourced from Nigeria in 2008–2009, 
reflecting the significant imports of crude petroleum from that country. South Africa is 
the second-largest import source with a share of 22.4%, followed by Egypt (8.7%), An-
gola (5.6%), Algeria (4%), and Morocco (3.8%) during 2008–2009. Petroleum products 
have become the largest items in India’s export basket in recent years (Beri, 2011: 6).
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(34) Delhi Declaration, India-Africa Forum Summit, New Delhi, April 9, 2008. Ministry of 
External Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/indafrica2008/09dc01.htm 
(Accessed May 31, 2011).
(35) Addis Ababa Declaration, Second India-Africa Forum Summit, Addis Ababa, May 25, 
2011. Ministry of External Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.
php?id=100017663andpid=2142 (Accessed May 29, 2011), Le Monde, May 27, 2011.
(36) Ministry of Defense (Japan), http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/operation/pirates.html 
(Accessed January 4, 2012).
(37) TICAD is formally organized with UN organizations. However, Japan practically orga-
nized it. About the TICAD process, see Japan’s ODA White Paper, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Japan), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white (Accessed September 12, 2011), 
Yokohama Declaration (May 28, 2008), TICAD4, Yokohama Action Plan (May 28, 2008), 
TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration (2003), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), http://
www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad3/declaration.html (Accessed September 3, 2011).
(38) This idea was proposed in the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1994 by Amartya 
Sen (Nobel Prize economics recipient) and Sadako Ogata (then UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees).
(39) For example, oil (Angola), minerals (DR Congo), peanuts (Senegal), and cocoa (Ghana) 
(Brautigam, 2009: 56). China required repayment by cocoa for a hydraulic power dam 
construction project in Ghana (Brautigam, 2009: 280). Western commercial banks also 
required repayment by oil from Angola for their loans (Brautigam, 2009: 291; Taylor, 
2009: 21). China is often scapegoated by western countries (Taylor, 2009: 164).
(40) Presentation handout by Yasuyuki Murahashi, at workshop of Industrial Strategy for 
African Development (African Growth Initiative), the National Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies (GRIPS), March 26, 2009, GRIPS, http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/
pdf09/2nd.pdf (Accessed June 17, 2012).
(41) Speech by a Japanese diplomat, Brown Bag Lunch workshop, the Foundation for Ad-
vanced Studies on International Development (FASID), June 23, 2003, Tokyo. http://
www.fasid.or.jp/chosa/forum/bbl/pdf/109.pdf (Accessed December 3, 2011).
(42) TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration (2003), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), http://
www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad3/declaration.html (Accessed September 3, 2011).
(43) See Note (42).
(44) OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_2649_33721_44141618_1_1_1_
 1,00.html (Accessed August 31, 2011).
(45) “Saemaeul Undong” is a movement for the development of rural communities, which was 
started in the 1970s under the Park administration.
(46) Les Afriques, http://www.lesafriques.com (Accessed May 31, 2011). Korea International 
Trade Association, http://global.kita.net, (Accessed June 15, 2012).
(47) BBC, “Madagascar leader axes land deal,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7952628.stm 
(Accessed November 25, 2011).
(48) South Korea was the host country of the G20 conference held in 2010.
(49) Seoul Declaration of the Second Korea-Africa Forum (November 24, 2009), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (South Korea), http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/Minis-
tryNews/20091218/1_10405.jsp (Accessed September 1, 2011).
(50) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaJ/press/release/
h20/12/1185463_922.html, http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/area/africa/jck_0912.html, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/area/africa/jck_1012.htm (Accessed September 1, 2011).
(51) China’s ODA Whitepaper, April 21, 2011, The Central People’s Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-04/21/content_1850553.htm 
(Accessed September 8, 2011); China’s African Policy (January 2006) http://www.china.
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org.cn/english/features/focac/183721.htm (Accessed May 14, 2011); Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012), November 2009, http://
www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm (Accessed May 14, 2011). Delhi Decla-
ration, India-Africa Forum Summit, New Delhi, April 9, 2008. Ministry of External Af-
fairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/indafrica2008/09dc01.htm (Accessed 
May 31, 2011). Addis Ababa Declaration, Second India-Africa Forum Summit, Addis 
Ababa, May 25, 2011. Ministry of External Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/mys-
tart.php?id=100017663andpid=2142 (Accessed May 29, 2011). Plan of Action of the 
Framework for Cooperation from the India-Africa Forum Summit, New Delhi, April 5, 
2008. Ministry of External Affairs (India), http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/
indafrica2008/05ia01.htm (Accessed May 31, 2011). Yokohama Declaration (May 28, 
2008), TICAD4, Yokohama Action Plan (May 28, 2008), TICAD. Tenth Anniversary 
Declaration (2003), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
africa/ticad3/declaration.html (Accessed September 3, 2011). Seoul Declaration of the 
Second Korea-Africa Forum (November 24, 2009). Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (South Korea), http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/MinistryNews/20091218/1_10405.
jsp (Accessed September 1, 2011).
(52) It means that state governance works correctly in expectation.
(53) So many concepts on the African states have been discussed and proposed in African 
political studies. For example, “Neo-Patrimonialism” and “Politique du ventre” are no-
table concepts regarding the public-ness of the state in Africa. See Bach & Gazibo eds. 
(2011) and Bayart (2006).
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